What do Brazilian citizens think about corruption? How have those attitudes changed since the 1985 transition to democracy? Drawing on data from a variety of public opinion polls, we describe popular attitudes towards corruption over the past 30 years. In the two decades following democratization, Brazilians’ aggregate concern for corruption remained relatively low, but that concern has moved consistently higher since 2005. At the individual level, respondents of higher socioeconomic status, men, and those who have been asked for a bribe are consistently more likely to list corruption as the country’s most important problem. Partisanship does not shape individuals’ views about the importance of the problem, but supporters of the incumbent party are consistently and significantly more likely than other respondents to believe that the government is making progress in combatting corruption. We conclude with observations on the implications of these findings for the likelihood of political action and institutional change concerning political corruption.
High profile corruption scandals have been a remarkable constant in Brazilian politics since the country's 1985 transition to democracy. Each of the six presidents preceding current President Michel Temer had at least one major corruption scandal erupt under their watch (Power & Taylor 2011). Large numbers of federal legislators have been implicated in the myriad and colorfully named scandals of the past three decades, including the Anões do Orçamento ("budget dwarves") scandal of 1993-94, the Sanguessuga ("bloodsucker") scandal of the mid-2000s, the Mensalão ("big monthly payment") scandal of 2005, and the Operação Lava Jato ("car wash") scandal that emerged in 2014 and continues at the time of this writing (Power & Taylor 2011; Carson & Prado 2014). At the subnational level, too, corruption seems rife—municipal audits from the mid-2000s reveal evidence of corruption in 80 percent of the municipalities audited by the federal Comptroller General's Office (CGU) (Ferraz & Finan 2011). As of 2008, one in three state legislators faced corruption charges (Melo 2014).

While corruption scandals have been a regular feature of Brazilian politics in the current democratic era, we know little about the evolution of popular attitudes toward corruption during this period. At times popular discontent has erupted into mass protests against corruption. In August and September of 1992, for example, allegations of corruption and self-enrichment against President Fernando Collor de Melo prompted a series of large-scale protests calling for his impeachment. In 2013, protests that were initially sparked by public transport price increases grew into large, country-wide demonstrations aimed at a broad range of perceived failings of the political elite, with corruption foremost among the public's grievances (Saad-Filho 2013; Winters & Weitz-

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1 In 2008, one in three sitting federal legislators was implicated in corruption; this figure had risen to one in two by 2016 (see Melo 2014 on 2008 and Transparência Brasil's website at http://www.excelencias.org.br/ (accessed 10 July 2016) for 2016).
2 Of course, corruption in Brazilian politics is not unique to the current democratic period, but that is our focus here. For an overview of corruption in Brazil from the colonial period to the 1990s, with a particular focus on the role of the press, see for example Lins da Silva (2000).
3 Although they started largely as a student movement, the protests gained traction among a larger cross-section of Brazilian society and culminated in a massive protest on September 18, 1992, when approximately 750,000 protestors joined a rally in São Paulo calling for Collor’s impeachment (Brooke 1992). By the end of that month, the Brazilian lower house had impeached Collor, and the Senate formally convicted him on December 30th, 1992, just one day after his resignation.
Shapiro 2014). At other times, however, there has been no obvious link between corruption and popular discontent. The 2005 Mensalão scandal under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, for example, did not engender mass public protests. Furthermore, while widespread street protests calling for the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016 mentioned corruption (among other grievances), Dilma herself was not accused of self-enrichment, and many observers point to other factors as more central to public disaffection with her presidency (e.g., Melo 2016; Petherick 2016). While protests and popular support for impeachment may give us some insights into public attitudes toward corruption, the breadth of these protests is also the result of many factors beyond attitudes toward corruption, including the media environment, partisan dynamics, and economic fundamentals (Pérez-Liñán 2007; Arce & Mangonnet 2013; Carlin, Love, and Martínez-Gallardo 2015).

In this chapter we describe and seek to explain the Brazilian public’s attitudes toward corruption in the current democratic period. To do so, we compile over-time data on citizens’ perceptions of and views about corruption. Recent years have seen a spate of single-shot polls and academic research on corruption in Brazil (this growth is perhaps itself a sign of changing public attention to the issue), and these generally find limited tolerance for corruption among the Brazilian public (e.g., Ferraz & Finan 2008, 2011; Rennó 2008; Pereira, Melo, and Figueiredo 2009; Winters & Weitz-Shapiro 2013; Manzetti & Rosas 2015). However, in most cases the surveys or policy experiments used in these studies are not available for an earlier period, making it difficult to examine the evolution of attitudes toward corruption over time. Here we combine data from a large number of public opinion surveys from 1987 to the present, focusing on questions asked over at least a ten-year period, to undertake a series of analyses of how Brazilians view corruption. How serious is the problem of corruption for Brazilians, how do they evaluate the government’s progress in combatting corruption, and how, if at all, have these views changed from the late 1980s to today?

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4 Dilma’s second term in office coincided with a severe downturn in the Brazilian economy, and she was impeached in April 2016 on charges of manipulating government budgeting rules rather than any direct involvement in corruption. She was removed from office at the end of August 2016.
Further, we explore the extent to which demographic characteristics, direct experiences with corruption, and partisan preferences explain differences in individual attitudes toward corruption.

To preview our findings, we find that the Brazilian public’s concern for corruption was relatively low in the two decades following democratization. Until the Mensalão scandal in 2005, an average of 5 percent of respondents listed corruption as the most important problem facing the country; since 2005, however, this average has been closer to 10 percent. In addition, this proportion spiked during periods of acute public attention to corruption such as the Mensalão scandal, although it quickly returned to medium-term average levels. The latest spike occurred in the midst of the Lava Jato scandal in 2015, making it too early to assess whether this corruption scandal—on track to be the largest ever documented anywhere (Taylor 2016)—will mark a permanent change in public attitudes toward corruption or whether concern for corruption will return to previous levels once the scandal has subsided.

At the individual level, we find that gender, socioeconomic status (SES), and corruption victimization are the most important predictors of respondents’ concern for corruption. Men, higher SES respondents, and those who have been asked for a bribe are consistently more likely to list corruption as the country’s most important problem throughout nearly three decades of public opinion polling. In contrast, concern for corruption does not appear to be constructed through a partisan lens—neither support for the sitting president or his or her party nor support for a party other than the party of the sitting president predicts whether an individual names corruption as the country’s most important problem, although there is some evidence this may be changing in the

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5 Table 1 in Appendix A uses data from the Latinobarometer series from 1995 to the present to compare the proportion of Brazilian respondents naming corruption as the most important problem facing the country to the median proportion of respondents in all Latin American countries giving the same answer. With a few exceptions in which concern for corruption in Brazil peaked in this survey (2005, 2007, and 2015), responses in Brazil are similar to those given in the region as a whole.

6 Taylor (2016) points to the different ways in which the Lava Jato scandal, and its exposure and prosecution, can be understood as either a mark of continuity or change with respect to previous corruption scandals in Brazil.
most recent surveys.\footnote{As we discuss below, results about how partisans do and do not act must be treated cautiously, since an individual’s willingness to declare a partisan identity may be affected by that person’s perceptions of corruption (Winters & Weitz-Shapiro 2015).}

Data limitations mean that we have a shorter series available to document how the public evaluates the government’s progress in combatting corruption; the earliest data come from 2003. Overall, as with responses to questions that reveal the importance respondents attach to corruption, we see both long-term consistency and also some sensitivity to current events in Brazilians’ evaluations of government progress in fighting corruption. On the whole, respondents describe the government’s progress as middling, with a notable drop in evaluations in 2014/2015. At the individual level, in contrast to the relative weakness of partisanship in predicting Brazilian citizens’ overall concern for corruption, incumbent supporters are consistently and significantly more likely to believe that the government is making greater progress in combatting corruption than other respondents. As others in this volume (Kearney & Machado, Abers & von Bülow, Samuels & Zucco, and Hagopian) suggest, the programmatic nature of the PT, which held the presidency from 2003 to 2016, makes it possible for voters to evaluate and sanction the party, as an institution, for its role in malfeasance.\footnote{The PT’s programmatic orientation stands in stark contrast with the remainder of the country’s inchoate parties (see Carreirão and Rennó, this volume). As these authors state, apart from the PT, “one is hard pressed to find parties’ policy agendas, political platforms, and ideological orientation.”}

This chapter’s findings substantiate Samuels and Zucco’s claim that partisans, specifically enduring PT partisans, use motivated reasoning to inform their opinions on particular issues, including the extent to which the government is effective in addressing corruption. Individuals who have experienced corruption, conversely, believe the government is making somewhat less progress. Other demographic characteristics have only weak or inconsistent relationships with perceived progress in combatting corruption.

Corruption as the Most Important Problem Facing Brazil
To what extent are Brazilians concerned about corruption? To answer this question, we rely on survey questions that solicit respondents’ opinions about “the most important problem” facing Brazil and include “corruption” as one possible answer. This yields the longest possible series documenting Brazilian attitudes toward corruption, covering almost the entire recent democratic period.\(^9\) We assembled data on this question from 69 surveys dating from 1987 to 2016, drawing on 69 surveys variously conducted by IBOPE and Datafolha (obtained from the University of Campinas’ Centro de Estudos de Opinião Pública (CESOP) data bank),\(^10\) the Brazil Electoral Study (ESEB), the Latinobarometer, and the AmericasBarometer conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). We included all nationally representative surveys from each of these sources that asked respondents to indicate the most important problem(s) in Brazil.\(^11\)

There are some differences in the precise question wording across the surveys. The Latinobarometer, ESEB, LAPOP, and some Datafolha and IBOPE surveys asked respondents to name “the” most important problem in the country. Other surveys conducted by Datafolha and IBOPE asked respondents to name multiple important problems.\(^12\) In these latter cases, we adjust the survey-level average to account for the option of naming multiple problems.\(^13\) For 18 of the 27 years in the sample, multiple surveys (across and/or within firms) asked respondents about the most

\[^9\] Some surveys in our series ask an open-ended question and then record spontaneous answers, while others provide respondents with a long list of possible problems, including corruption, which respondents choose from.

\[^10\] [http://www.unicamp.br/cesop/Bancodados.htm](http://www.unicamp.br/cesop/Bancodados.htm) (accessed 18 July 2016)

\[^11\] We identified the relevant IBOPE and Datafolha surveys in CESOP using keyword searches and manual browsing.

\[^12\] The precise questions included in our series generally adopted some variation of the following forms: To begin, in your opinion, which is the most serious problem that your country is experiencing? (LAPOP) or And thinking now about the situation in Brazil, please tell me the three areas in which you think that Brazil is experiencing the most severe problems? (IBOPE).

\[^13\] In these cases, we divide by the number of problems solicited to generate an estimate of the share of respondents who would have named corruption if only a single problem had been solicited. In Figure 1 in the Appendix, we present an alternative version of the series calculated from a regression that controls for differences in the number of items solicited, whether or not respondents were presented with a list of problems, and the number of problems coded by the survey firm. In the individual-level analyses presented in the next section, we treat respondents who name corruption as any one of their responses as if they consider corruption to be the most important problem; the survey effects are subsumed into the intercepts in those regression models.
important problem facing Brazil. For these years, we report a simple average from across all surveys of the adjusted proportion of respondents who name corruption as the most important problem. For the remaining years, we present the proportion from the single survey from that year.

Figure 1.1 presents the data. As the figure shows, the proportion of respondents naming corruption as the country’s most important problem is relatively low in the two decades after democratization. Before 2005, the average adjusted proportion of Brazilians naming corruption as the most important problem facing the country is 5 percent, and it is always less than 1 in 10. Our data show a spike in public attention to corruption in 2005, after which the medium-term average adjusted proportion of respondents naming corruption shifts upwards to 10 percent until it spikes again in 2015.

INSERT FIGURE 1.1 ABOUT HERE

These two spikes in the share of respondents naming corruption as an important problem can be linked to the emergence of two major corruption scandals, the Mensalão and the Lava Jato. The Mensalão scandal began in late 2004 with news reports alleging that the ruling Workers’ Party was making large payments to opposition lawmakers in exchange for their support of the party’s legislative agenda. In June 2005, Federal Deputy Roberto Jefferson provided further details publicly, and the scandal became known as the “Mensalão,” or “large monthly payment,” scandal. The legislature established a number of official investigative committees related to the scandal, and it came to dominate news reports in the months that followed. In the Latinobarometer survey for that year (fielded in August and early September), 22 percent of respondents said that corruption was the most important problem facing Brazil. This response was second only to unemployment, which

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14 Note that this period includes some moments of acute public attention to corruption, including the corruption scandal surrounding President Collor de Melo, which led to public protests and his eventual removal from office in 1992.

15 A series of t-tests comparing the mean number of respondents citing corruption as the most important problem in these two peak years, 2005 and 2015, with the mean number of respondents indicating corruption as the most important problem in the years immediately preceding and succeeding them suggests that the values observed in these years are statistically significantly different from the adjoining years.
was mentioned by 29 percent of respondents. Corruption was mentioned more than twice as frequently as crime, health, and the umbrella category of "political problems," each of which was named by about 10 percent of respondents.\textsuperscript{16}

By the following year, however, the proportion of respondents naming corruption as the most important problem facing Brazil had fallen by half; 9 percent of Latinobarometer respondents gave this response. Unemployment remained the country's major concern, named by 22 percent of respondents; this was followed by concerns about health, named by 16 percent. Thus, in the wake of the Mensalão scandal the data suggest that the Brazilian public viewed corruption as a somewhat more central issue than previously, but the high levels of attention to the issue generated during the height of the scandal were not sustained.\textsuperscript{17}

The next spike in public concern for corruption occurs in 2015, when the highest proportion of respondents in the entire series mentions corruption as the country's most important problem. Figure 1 shows that, in 2014, 12 percent of the population identified corruption as the most important problem.\textsuperscript{18} Although news of corruption accusations involving executives from the state oil company, Petrobras, had begun to emerge in March of that year, the pace of news and arrests would accelerate over the months that followed. In November a former Petrobras executive and over a dozen executives from construction and engineering firms were arrested as part of the Operação Lava Jato ("Operation Car Wash").\textsuperscript{19} The 2015 Latinobarometer survey, carried out in January and February 2015, shows a substantial increase in public attention to corruption. In this survey, corruption is the single most commonly cited "most important problem": nearly 25 percent of respondents gave this response. Health was named by 17 percent, crime by 9 percent, and a broader

\textsuperscript{16} For 2005, the Latinobarometer is the only national survey of which we are aware that asked questions about the most important problem facing Brazil.

\textsuperscript{17} This suggests some parallels to the effects of the Mensalão on individual partisanship in the Brazil two-city panel survey (Baker et al. 2016). These authors find that the share of PT identifiers declined as a result of the Mensalão, but these levels rebounded by the time of Lula's reelection in late 2006.

\textsuperscript{18} In Figure 1, the data from 2014 are drawn from the AmericasBarometer survey, which was conducted in March and April of that year.

\textsuperscript{19} The scandal became known by this name because it emerged as a result of a money laundering investigation tied to the owner of a gas station, the site of a former car wash (Segal 2015).
“political crisis,” itself likely linked to corruption, by 9 percent of respondents. Will the public’s focus on corruption persist, or will it revert back to levels more in line with long-term averages? As of this writing, in 2017, it is too early to say whether Brazil’s latest political crisis will lead to a sustained increase in public concern about corruption over the medium to long term.

Who is Concerned with Corruption?

What distinguishes those Brazilians who report that corruption is one of the most important problem(s) facing their country from their fellow citizens? The wealth of surveys we analyze allows us to investigate the individual-level predictors of mentions of corruption and to examine whether these factors have changed since the late 1980s. In the analysis that follows, we focus on respondent characteristics and preferences that are plausibly prior to a respondent’s stated view on the country’s most important problem, including gender, age, education level, and social class or income, and, where possible, partisan preferences and corruption victimization.20

For each of the 69 surveys where we have sufficient socio-demographic information, we implement a logistic regression model predicting whether or not a respondent in a given survey named corruption as one of the most important problem(s) facing Brazil. With the possible exception in recent years of the role of partisanship (see the discussion below), we find striking levels of consistency in the factors that predict whether a respondent names corruption as an important problem. We present our results graphically below in Figure 1.2, panels A-F. Each panel in

20 In order to draw comparisons across surveys, we transform responses for a number of variables. For a surprising number of surveys, a raw age measure is not available, forcing us to combine idiosyncratic age categories to the best of our ability. In the regression results reported here, we use four age categories (with some surveys deviating slightly): 16-24/25, 25-40, 40-50, and 50+. We collapse education to four categories: less than complete primary, complete primary but incomplete secondary, complete secondary but incomplete tertiary, and complete tertiary and beyond. Given the income categories in each survey, we sort survey respondents into quintiles within a given survey and then assign those quintile values to the respondents as a cross-survey measure of their income. Latinobarometer surveys do not include an income variable; for these surveys, we use the enumerator’s subjective assessment of the respondent’s social class. For partisanship, we include indicators for whether or not the respondent is aligned with the incumbent president or with some other party (leaving those who report no affiliation as the omitted category). We use either a question that asks the respondent his or her preferred party (most surveys) or what party he or she would vote for if the election were held today/Sunday (Latinobarometer surveys). We examine the robustness of our results to alternative definitions of this variable below.
the figure focuses on a single predictor. For each predictor, we plot the regression coefficient and 95-percent confidence interval for that predictor as estimated in a series of survey-specific regressions. Each coefficient comes from a multivariate regression controlling for all of the other predictors available for that survey. Each tick mark on the horizontal axis in each panel of the figure notes the year and survey firm administering the survey that we analyze to produce the corresponding regression coefficient.

Perhaps the strongest finding, and a remarkably consistent one over nearly 30 years of data, is that men are more likely than women to name corruption as an important problem facing the country. Panel A of Figure 1.2 presents this result. In nearly all the included surveys, the difference between the likelihood that male and female respondents mention corruption as the most important problem facing the country is statistically significant and, as we note below, it holds even when we include an additional control for corruption victimization over the past twelve months (in the years that question was asked).21 Drawing on the data across all surveys, an average of 17 percent of men and 9 percent of women indicate that corruption is either the most or one of the most important problems facing Brazil.

Why might it be the case that men are more likely than women to view corruption as a very important problem for Brazil? The existing literature on corruption and gender has tended to emphasize women’s greater distaste for corruption (e.g., Redlawsk & McCann 2005) as well as the fact that men are more willing to engage in corrupt behavior both in the real world and in experimental settings (e.g., Corbacho, Gingerich, Oliveros and Ruiz-Vega 2016; see also the summary of relevant studies in Chaudhuri 2012).22 Indeed, responses to other questions asked in some of the surveys we analyze here are consistent with the claim that men are more willing actually to engage

21 Men are somewhat more likely to report being asked for a bribe by a public official than women.
22 Esarey and Chirillo (2013) argue that women are more averse than men to the risks of violating political norms and therefore follow those norms more closely. They argue that this explains why women are less likely than men to engage in and approve of corruption where it is stigmatized (in most democracies) but equally likely where it is not (in most autocracies). Other public opinion works finds evidence for the opposite. Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz (2013) ask Spanish respondents to rate the severity of a corrupt act. They find that men are more likely to rate the same act as more severe.
in corrupt behavior. In the AmericasBarometer surveys we examine, men are more likely than women to agree with the statement that, “the ways things are now, sometimes paying a bribe is justified.” Men are also more likely than women to report corruption victimization in the past twelve months. These findings need not be understood as contradictory. As we discuss below, we find some evidence that individuals who have been approached for a bribe are also more likely to view corruption as a serious problem. This suggests that individuals who witness or participate in corrupt acts may also have a stronger motivation to eliminate them. Available measures of corruption victimization only capture exposure to corruption in the past twelve months. Given men’s higher victimization rates, it is likely that a larger proportion of male respondents have paid a bribe in a period prior to the past twelve months that cannot be captured by our measure. Future work might usefully collect data on both more recent and distant direct exposure to corruption to examine whether differences in direct experience with corruption explain the gender differences we observe.

It is also possible that our results reflect the somewhat different nature of the questions we examine compared to those investigated in other research. Women may evaluate acts of corruption as more severe than men yet nonetheless prioritize other issues, such as health and education. Again, future work could help examine whether the pronounced gender differences we find in naming corruption as a country’s most important problem are unique to Brazil or exist more widely.

INSERT FIGURE 1.2, ALL PANELS, ABOUT HERE

With respect to education and income (or social class), our results show that, over nearly 30 years of public opinion surveys, more educated and, to a somewhat lesser extent, higher income Brazilians are more likely to declare that corruption is their country’s most important problem. Figure 1.2 (Panels B and C) presents these results. The relationship between higher levels of

23 The average difference between men and women across all survey waves is almost four percentage points, and the difference is statistically significant in all survey waves.
education and greater concern for corruption is overwhelmingly positive and is sometimes statistically significant across surveys and time. For example, in the 2012 LAPOP survey, the predicted probability that an otherwise “average” respondent with the lowest education level would name corruption as Brazil’s most important problem is three percent. Moving that same respondent to the highest education category raises the probability of citing corruption as the most important problem to nine percent. The relationship between income quintiles (or, in the case of the Latinobarometer, enumerator assessment of social class) and the likelihood of mentioning corruption as Brazil’s most important problem is somewhat less strong over the course of the series. Although the coefficient on income is consistently positive and significant in the first part of the series, the relationship is somewhat attenuated since about 2003. Since that time, a number of surveys find no significant relationship between income and concern for corruption.

With respect to our final basic demographic variable, age, older people are on the whole somewhat more likely than other respondents to name corruption as the most important problem facing Brazil. This result is consistent with previous research that shows less tolerance of and/or lower willingness to engage in corruption among older respondents (e.g., Torgler & Valev 2006; Corbacho et al. 2016; Pavão 2016). As Panel D of Figure 1.2 shows, the estimated relationship between age and mentions of corruption is typically, but not always, positive, and the relationship is weaker—and in some cases even reversed—in surveys dating to the late 1980s as well as in the most recent surveys.

Finally, we examine the relationship between partisan sympathies with the sitting president

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24 This is consistent with existing literature on attitudes toward corruption from a number of different countries; more educated respondents are less tolerant of corruption and judge corrupt acts as more severe (e.g., Truex 2011; Anduiza, Gallego and Muñoz 2014; Shafiq 2015). We are not aware of any other work that employs mentions of corruption as a country’s most important problem as the dependent variable.

25 The literature on the relationship between income or social class and corruption tolerance is mixed, with some finding evidence that wealthier citizens are more tolerant of corruption (Gatti, Paternostro and Rigolini 2003; Shafiq 2015; Winters & Weitz-Shapiro 2013), while others document greater tolerance among the poor, either in general (M. Figueiredo 2004) or under specific circumstances (Pavão 2016).

26 The mean value of the coefficients on income before 2003 is 0.21; the mean value of the coefficients on income after 2003 is 0.12. This 0.09 point difference is statistically significant (p < 0.03).
or with some other party and the likelihood that a respondent reports corruption as the most important problem facing Brazil. We identify a respondent as a partisan sympathizer based on survey questions that directly elicited respondents’ partisanship or, in the case of the Latinobarometer, by using a question that asked respondents which party they would vote for “if the elections were held today/Sunday.” Panel E of Figure 1.2 shows that, for much of the period under study, the likelihood that a respondent names corruption as the country’s most important problem does not vary significantly between copartisans of the sitting president and other respondents.

Likewise, Panel F suggests that respondents who sympathize with a political party that is not the president’s party are – in most surveys – no more or less likely to view corruption as an important problem. To the extent that dissatisfaction with corruption itself affects the likelihood that a respondent reports being a copartisan of the president (similar to findings in Baker et al. (2015) and Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2015)), this should, if anything, depress expressions of copartisanship among those who mention corruption. If corruption perceptions did, in fact, drive partisan affiliations, this would increase the likelihood that we would detect a significant negative relationship between copartisanship and mentions of corruption. Because we do not observe a statistically significant negative relationship, we can be quite confident that no such relationship exists for much of the current democratic period.

Panel E in Figure 1.2 does suggest the possibility of an emerging relationship between incumbent support and mentions of corruption in the latter part of the period under study.

Beginning with 2009, for example, the estimated regression coefficient on incumbent partisan

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27 Datafolha and IBOPE surveys generally use a single-stage question about partisanship, while LAPOP uses a two-stage question, first asking respondents if they identify with any party in particular and only asking the name of that party if they reply to the first question in the affirmative. The Latinobarometer question is admittedly a noisy measure of partisanship, and, as one would expect, it leads to a higher estimate of partisan sympathy. Using these measures, we classify 46 percent of Latinobarometer respondents as incumbent partisan sympathizers, but only 29 percent of LAPOP respondents as such.

28 Survey measures of partisanship can be sensitive to timing, with greater numbers of respondents reporting partisan sympathies in the immediate run-up to an election. To assess the possibility that differences in survey timing may distort our results, we regress the estimated partisanship coefficients on a variable that measures the number of months to the election for a given survey. We find no significant relationship between the months until the election and the coefficients that we estimate on incumbent partisanship or their absolute value.
sympathies is negative in 9 out of the 10 surveys we analyze (although the coefficients reach at least marginal levels of statistical significance in only 3 of those cases). In other words, PT supporters have become less likely relative to non-partisans to say that corruption is the most important problem in Brazil.\textsuperscript{29} We see a similar pattern in the 2006 Latinobarometer, where PT supporters in the wake of the Mensalão scandal were significantly less likely, relative to non-partisans, to say that corruption was the most important issue in the country. Panel F of Figure 1\textsuperscript{2} illustrates the relationship between sympathy for a party other than that of the president and the likelihood of listing corruption as Brazil’s most important problem. We find four positive and at least marginally statistically significant coefficients since 2009, indicating that respondents who support a party other than the PT are more likely than non-partisans to view corruption as an important problem. Taken together, these patterns may indicate a growing partisan polarization around the issue of corruption, something other observers have noted (Taylor 2016).

However, the nature of the data makes it impossible to say whether partisan polarization around corruption reflects changing attitudes among partisans or changing partisan identity among citizens concerned with corruption. Data constraints mean that the Latinobarometer – where we rely on a question about vote intention to assess partisan sympathy – is disproportionately represented in surveys since 2009.\textsuperscript{30} It is quite possible that the individuals most concerned about corruption are moving away from the PT during this period (Winters & Weitz-Shapiro 2014, 2015; Baker et al. 2016), so that a belief in the importance of corruption drives incumbent sympathies and not vice-versa.

We explore this possibility in greater detail by using additional information about partisan

\textsuperscript{29} It is worth noting that the two large corruption scandals of the past decade had some different partisan natures. The Mensalão scandal involved a PT government distributing funds illegally to both PT and non-PT deputies, while the Lava Jato engulfed mainly the PT and its coalition partners.

\textsuperscript{30} A question about vote intention is more likely than a true partisanship measure to be subject to reverse causation. That is, respondents whose concern for corruption leads them to be unhappy with the current administration are also unlikely to state that they intend to vote for the party of the sitting president if the election were held today.
commitment that is available for a subset of our surveys. For the 2006-2014 LAPOP surveys, we use questions about vote choice in the prior and most recent election to identify respondents who voted for the PT in both elections; for the purposes of this analysis, we treat such behavior as a proxy for consistent incumbent partisanship, although an imperfect one.31 We also identify respondents who consistently voted for the same non-PT party across these same two elections; we think of these respondents as consistent in their support for a non-PT (i.e., non-incumbent) party. We consider respondents who voted for different parties across the two elections as inconsistent partisan supporters or non-partisans.

Using these more stringent measures of partisanship, we re-estimate our logistic regression models and find that our previous estimates of the relationship between concern for corruption and partisanship are robust to using this stricter method for identifying partisan sympathizers. Although the point estimates vary, the significance and directionality rarely change as we transition between more and less stringent measures of partisanship. This robustness check increases our confidence that in the most recent years under study identifying as a PT sympathizer decreases the probability that an individual will feel as concerned about corruption as supporters of other parties or non-partisans.

To preview our discussion later in this chapter, the long-term weakness of partisan sympathy as a predictor of concern for corruption contrasts with the importance of partisanship in predicting citizens’ evaluations of the government’s progress in combating corruption. On the whole, attention to corruption has not been a polarizing partisan issue in Brazil since the 1980s, though there is some indication this is changing. Future survey research should shed light on whether there is a persistent shift among Brazilians to forming perceptions of the severity of

31 As has been well known since at least Benewick (1969), reports of past choice are likely to be biased by current preferences over political parties. Individuals who report having been PT voters in both previous elections may not be correctly recalling or reporting their vote choices. Even where this is the case, however, the measure nonetheless identifies the set of survey respondents who, in this way, express the strongest level of support for the PT. We, thus, believe that the measure remains a more stringent one.
corruption through a partisan lens. Additionally, future work would be well served to assess the relationship between disassociation with a particular political party – what Samuel and Zucco and Carreirão and Renno term “negative partisanship” (this volume) – and concern with corruption.

Corruption Victimization and Corruption as an Important Problem

How do individual experiences with corruption affect the likelihood that a respondent names corruption as Brazil’s most important problem? To answer this question, we employ an excellent set of questions on direct corruption victimization pioneered by Seligson (2006) and used by the LAPOP. In the five surveys carried out since its inception in 2006, LAPOP has asked respondents whether they have been asked for a bribe (“suborno”) in the past twelve months by a series of public servants, including a police officer, a bureaucrat (“funcionário publico”), or a representative of the justice system. It is important to note that the question does not ask respondents if they actually paid a bribe, which should minimize social desirability bias against acknowledging participation in an illegal and socially sensitive behavior like bribery. For the purposes of our analysis, we collapse responses into a dichotomous variable that takes on the value of 1 if the respondent reports being solicited for a bribe by any public official in the past twelve months. For each survey for which we have data on corruption victimization, we regress an indicator for whether a respondent listed corruption as Brazil’s most important problem on the demographic and partisan variables described.

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32 Taylor (2016) makes a similar point.
33 Some questions are asked of all respondents, whereas others are asked in two stages. A first question asks whether the respondent has used a certain public service (for example, public health) in the past year, and then only those who answer in the affirmative are asked if they were approached for a bribe. For the purpose of creating our corruption victimization measure, we code as 1 an individual who reports being approached for a bribe by any public official, regardless of whether he or she used all possible public services. Following the common definition of corruption as abuse of public office for private gain, we do not count respondents who said they were asked for a bribe in their place of work, but nowhere else, as corruption victims.
above, along with the corruption victimization indicator.\textsuperscript{34}

\textbf{INSERT FIGURE 1.3 ABOUT HERE}

Figure 1.3 presents the results. For each of the five years for which we have data, the regressions reveal a positive and, for 2006 and 2014, an (at least marginally) statistically significant relationship between corruption victimization and the likelihood the respondent names corruption as the most important problem confronting Brazil.\textsuperscript{35} For an otherwise average male respondent from the 2014 wave of the LAPOP survey, having been asked to pay a bribe increases the probability he will name corruption as the most important issue facing the country from 10 to 14 percent.\textsuperscript{36} Reassuringly, results for the sociodemographic variables are generally unchanged even with the inclusion of the measure of corruption victimization.\textsuperscript{37} More educated and higher income men are more likely to view corruption as Brazil's most important problem.

An older scholarly literature on corruption characterized bribery as an efficient and necessary shortcut to make government work (e.g., Leff 1964), and in popular parlance Brazilians often point to the “jeitinho,” or the “Brazilian way” of making things work (which may or may not involve explicit corruption) as necessary in interactions with both the state and society. More recent popular and scholarly discourse (e.g., Hardoon & Heinrich 2013; Rose-Ackerman 1999) instead identifies corruption and bribery as negative practices that impose serious costs on the average citizen. Our results support this view and are consistent with other work in Latin America showing

\textsuperscript{34} Table 2 in the appendix presents the share of respondents who report having been asked for a bribe in the past year. Of the five surveys for which we have this measure, the figure is at its highest in 2010, when 20 percent of respondents report having been approached to pay a bribe.

\textsuperscript{35} In a related finding for the region as a whole, Manzetti and Rosas (2015) find that victims of corruption are more likely to perceive generalized corruption.

\textsuperscript{36} In the 2014 LAPOP survey, the average respondent is a male in his 30s who has completed primary but not secondary education, is in the fourth income quintile, and is not a PT partisan.

\textsuperscript{37} This is true even though men are more likely to report having been approached for a bribe than women: over the years for which we have data, 16 percent of men and 12 percent of women report being asked for a bribe.
that experiences with corruption are viewed by most citizens as problematic (e.g., Manzetti & Rosas 2015; Seligson 2006) rather than as a convenient way to resolve issues with public officials.

Our findings also point to some interesting implications for anti-corruption policy. The possibility that individual citizens who are (potentially) involved in corrupt transactions are also most likely to condemn the practice is worth noting. It suggests that campaigns to elicit public support for efforts to decrease corruption would do well to view citizens who may have been involved in small-scale corrupt transactions as potential allies rather than opponents to reform. The strength of personal experience with corruption as a predictor also suggests that petty, low-level corruption in interactions with street-level bureaucrats, not just the grand scandals that fill the airwaves, are important for understanding how Brazilians understand the severity of corruption and evaluate their political landscape.

How Does the Public View Government Progress on Combating Corruption?

We turn next to the public’s evaluation of the government’s success in combating corruption. In the eyes of many observers, the Brazilian state has been remarkably successful, especially in recent years, in developing a competent state apparatus capable of uncovering and punishing corruption (although with greater capacity for the former than the latter). The Tribunal de Contas da União (Federal Court of Accounts), which has roots dating to the 19th century, is empowered to conduct investigations against elected and appointed officials (Carson & Prado 2014). Over the period from 1997 to 2007, the value of government funds that it inspected rose steadily, as did the number of officeholders convicted of corruption, the amount of fines levied, and the number of companies banned from bidding on government contracts because of TCU investigations (Speck 2011). Similarly, the Ministério Público Federal (Federal Public Prosecutor) enjoys a broad mandate and a very high level of independence (Carson & Prado 2014). Along with the Federal police, the MPF has been a leading force in many recent corruption investigations. Other efforts to combat
corruption over the past decade include an ambitious program of municipal audits run by the CGU, a program that has proven effective in uncovering misuse of funds at the municipal level (Ferraz & Finan 2008; Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti, and Tabellini 2013). In addition, new laws have increased the penalties for both individuals and companies associated with corruption. In 2010 the legislature enacted the Lei da Ficha Limpa (Clean Record Law), which allowed electoral courts to ban politicians from running for office based on criminal convictions, and in 2013 the legislature passed an anti-corruption law that extended criminal liability to corporations. It earned comparisons to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the U.K. Bribery Act (Richard 2014).

In spite of these institutional accomplishments, many observers have noted that Brazilians remain skeptical of the state’s capacity to detect and (especially) to punish corruption (Taylor & Buranelli 2007). Our analysis of slightly more than a decade of data on citizen evaluations of the state’s success in combatting corruption (2003-present) lends support to this characterization. To explore citizens’ views on anti-corruption efforts specifically, we rely on questions from the Latinobarometer and LAPOP asking about the government’s progress on fighting corruption over the past year (LAPOP) or two years (Latinobarometer).

Figure 4 presents the results for both series. Overall, the figures show that Brazilians evaluate their government’s success in combatting corruption as middling to poor, with few changes over time. Somewhat surprisingly, evaluations of government success in combatting corruption appear somewhat less sensitive to current events than do rankings of corruption as Brazil’s most important problem. There is no evidence, for example, that citizens changed their evaluations of government success in combatting corruption in the wake of the 2005/2006 Mensalão scandal.

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38 With the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff, the future of the audit program remains in doubt. The CGU was dissolved by President Michel Temer in May 2016 and its functions folded into a new Ministry of Transparency, Supervision and Control.

39 Implementation of this law lagged, however; as of early 2016, no company had yet been punished under the law (F. O. V. de Figueiredo 2016). These efforts in Brazil are emblematic of a broader regional trend, including Mexico’s General Law of Administrative Responsibility and Peru’s Corporation Corruption Act, both of which took effect in 2017.

40 The Latinobarometer asked respondents to reply on a 7-point scale and the LAPOP on a 4-point scale. We have rescaled both sets of responses so they run from 1 to 4. See the exact wording for each question in the appendix.
the other hand, in the most recent Latinobarometer survey – conducted during the midst of the Lava Jato scandal in 2015– respondents did provide more negative evaluations of the government’s progress in fighting corruption. Indeed, in 2015 evaluations of such progress reached the lowest level included in our series. Although the short nature of the series makes it difficult to know for certain, it may be the case that renewed public attention to corruption in the wake of the Lava Jato scandal increased skepticism among the Brazilian public about the government’s ability to combat it.

Who Believes the Government is More Successful in Combating Corruption?

In an analysis parallel to that described above, we consider the individual-level correlates of perceptions of the government’s success in combatting corruption, presenting the results in Figure 1.5. Here, in contrast to the most important problem series, there is no clear relationship between any of the demographic factors we examine—gender, age, income, and education—and respondents’ evaluations of the government’s success in combatting corruption. Instead, and in contrast to the previous series, the most important predictor of a respondent’s evaluation of the government’s progress in combatting corruption is his or her partisanship. Note that given the more limited time series available for this outcome, the PT held the presidency for the entire period examined here. For every individual survey in this period, we see a positive and at least marginally significant relationship between PT partisanship and a respondent’s evaluation of the government’s success in combatting corruption. As discussed above, we cannot be certain that PT partisanship causes a more positive evaluation of government success, rather than the reverse. Regardless of the direction of causality, the data show that PT partisans are consistently more likely to rank the government as making more progress fighting corruption. The average marginal effect across the 15 surveys in the data is 0.2 points on a four-point scale. In contrast with PT partisans, there is

41 For the LAPOP measure, the 2014 observation is 0.21 points below the long-term average of 2.15, and this difference is significant at the p < 0.08 level. For the Latinobarometer measure, the 2015 observation is 0.42 points below the long-term average of 2.17, and this difference is significant at the p < 0.02 level.
no consistent relationship between sympathy with another political party, perhaps in part an artifact of the small number of other party sympathizers and the shifting alliances between the PT and other parties on the national stage. These relationships between partisanship and perceptions of government progress in combating corruption are robust to the inclusion of the stricter measure of partisanship (discussed above) created using the LAPOP surveys.

The strength of partisanship as a predictor of citizens’ evaluations of government progress in combating corruption contrasts with its relative weakness as a predictor of mentions of corruption as the country’s most important problem. In long-established democracies, partisanship is an important lens through which citizens understand and interpret the political world, a so-called “unmoved mover” that affects the information citizens seek out and their evaluations of government performance (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Shickler 2004; Achen & Bartels 2016). Although partisanship in Brazil has traditionally been portrayed as quite weak, more recent work points to the ways in which partisanship—especially PT partisanship—has been relatively resilient, even in the face of scandal (Baker et al. 2016) and can be an important predictor of political preferences and behavior (Samuels & Zucco 2014). Our results show one way in which partisanship in Brazil appear to shape citizens’ assessments of their government’s performance. This is consistent with results from other democracies that show that copartisanship attenuates the effects of corruption on citizen support for the government (Anderson & Tverdova 2003) and that copartisans are less willing to sanction corrupt politicians (e.g., Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz 2013; Eggers 2014; Ecker, Glinitzer, and Meyer 2015). At the same time, our results show that in a context where corruption itself has not (historically) been a highly polarizing partisan issue, partisanship does not appear to set the agenda of what citizens care about.

Corruption Victimization and Government Progress

The AmericasBarometer data also affords us the opportunity to include corruption victimization as a predictor of perceptions of government progress in fighting corruption. Figure 1.6
presents the results. Once again we report the coefficient on an indicator variable for whether a respondent has been approached to pay a bribe. We run a separate regression for each year, and in each regression we include the demographic and partisan controls discussed above. The relationship between perceptions of government progress and corruption victimization is consistently negative, although never statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. The results suggest that although direct experience may matter, it is likely that both experiences and perceptions of corruption as well as the perceptual lens of partisanship affect how individuals evaluate government progress against corruption.

Conclusions

In the wake of the recent massive “Lava Jato” scandal, there is no denying that corruption in Brazil has become insidious, reaching across the highest levels of political and business elites. In 2014, when that scandal was still in its early phases, President Dilma Rousseff stated that the scandal would mark a sea of change in Brazilian politics, claiming that it would “change forever the relationship between Brazilian society, the Brazilian state and private companies.”42 It certainly has had important economic and political consequences, including a huge negative effect on the valuation of Brazil’s largest publicly traded company, Petrobras, and the impeachment and removal from office of the president herself.

What are likely to be the consequences of this scandal for the attitudes of the Brazilian public toward corruption? Although it is too early to know for certain, a look back at popular attitudes toward corruption in the current democratic period should offer some insights. That is what we

42 In Portuguese, “[e]u acho que isso mudará para sempre as relações entre a sociedade brasileira, o Estado brasileiro e as empresas privadas” (BBC Brazil 2014).
have sought to do in this chapter. Drawing on nearly 70 surveys carried out over almost three decades, we have put together the most comprehensive time series to date on the extent to which Brazilians think of corruption as the country’s most important problem and their evaluations of the government’s progress in combatting it.

These data show signs of both continuity and change in attitudes toward corruption among the Brazilian public. As might be expected, popular concern for corruption spiked in the wake of the Lava Jato scandal, reaching its highest level in our series, with about 22 percent of respondents reporting that corruption is the most important problem facing Brazil. This is a large difference from the rates at which respondents mentioned corruption earlier in the democratic period, which hovered in the single digits. At the same time, surveys from 2005, during the Mensalão scandal, reveal levels of public concern almost as high as those seen recently. These levels fell after the scandal ebbed. Surveys from the next few years should be watched closely to learn whether or not the public’s concern for corruption continues at these high levels.

This chapter also offers some insight into whether there exists a public consensus for reforms that might successfully address the apparently entrenched nature of corruption in the Brazilian political system. The fact that popular concern for corruption has not historically been filtered through a partisan lens in Brazil may suggest that there is potential for broad consensus for reform. However, data in more recent years seems to suggest a change in that pattern, with supporters of the governing PT, compared to non-supporters, less likely to consider corruption to be the country’s most important problem. In addition, citizens’ views on progress in combating corruption seem to be formed through a partisan lens, with supporters of the government perceiving more success.

Dilma’s impeachment and removal from office, along with former two-term PT President Lula’s conviction for corruption while running for a third term in office, are likely to further polarize popular attitudes on corruption. To the extent this trend continues or strengthens, it may be
more difficult to create the kind of public support needed to sustain serious reforms to the Brazilian political system.

Finally, it is important to note that while massive and expensive scandals among elites deservedly attract much attention, both in Brazil and abroad, Brazilians’ direct experiences with corruption in their interactions with government officials—including police officers, the justice system, and public health—also affect citizens’ views on corruption. If the Brazilian state is to change citizens’ views of corruption, it must address their direct experiences with corruption outside of the limelight as well as during the high-profile scandals that have received so much attention in recent years.
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Figure 1.1: Corruption as the Most Important Problem Facing Brazil. Note: This figure compiles data from IBOPE, Datafolha, LAPOP, ESEB, and Latinobarometer surveys. For surveys that solicited more than one “most” important problem from respondents, we divide by the number of problems solicited to get an estimate of the share of respondents who believe corruption is the most important problem. For years that included more than one survey, we take a simple average across the estimates from all surveys conducted in that year.
Figure 1.2: Predictors of Naming Corruption as the Most Important Problem. Note: Each figure presents the coefficient estimate and 95 percent confidence interval from a multivariate logistic regression estimated with data from the survey specified on the horizontal axis. Since not all variables are included in all surveys, some panels report results from more regression models than others.
Figure 1.3: Corruption Victimization and Corruption as the Most Important Problem. Note: the figure reports coefficient estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals from survey-specific multivariate logistic regression models. The surveys associated with each model are indicated on the horizontal axis. In addition to corruption victimization, the regressions include age, education, income, and indicators for being male, sharing partisanship with the incumbent president, and expressing a partisan affiliation with a party other than that of the incumbent president.
Figure 1.4: Perceptions of Government Progress in Combatting Corruption. Note: this figure presents mean perceptions using data from the LAPOP and Latinobarometer surveys. We have rescaled the LAPOP data from a 1-7 scale to the 1-4 scale used by the Latinobarometer.
Figure 1.5: Predictors of Perceptions of Government Progress in Combatting Corruption.

Note: each figure presents the coefficient estimate and 95 percent confidence interval from a multivariate linear regression model estimated with data from the survey specified on the horizontal axis.
Figure 1.6: Corruption Victimization and Government Progress in Combatting Corruption. Note: the figure reports coefficient estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals from survey-specific multivariate linear regressions. The surveys associated with each model are indicated on the horizontal axis. In addition to corruption victimization, the regressions include age, education, income, and indicators for being male, sharing partisanship with the incumbent president, and expressing a partisan affiliation with a party other than that of the incumbent president.
Appendices

Appendix A

Figure 1.A1: Corruption as the Most Important Problem Facing Brazil (Alternative). Note: This figure uses data from IBOPE, Datafolha, LAPOP, ESEB, and Latinobarometer surveys. We regress the proportion of people saying that corruption is one of the most important problems facing the country on a series of survey characteristics: the year of the survey, the number of answers solicited, whether or not respondents were presented with a list of problems, and the number of responses coded by the survey firm. We then predict the proportion of people saying that corruption would be the most important problem in a given year if only one response had been solicited, a list had been offered, and the number of options on the list was minimal and present this number in the plot.
Table 1.A1: Proportion of Brazilian and Latin American Respondents Naming Corruption as the Most Important Problem Facing Their Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>LA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data from Latinobarometer surveys asking respondents to name the most important problem facing their country.

Table 1.A2: Proportion of Respondents Self-Reporting Corruption Victimization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Corruption Victimization Proportions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data from LAPOP surveys asking respondents whether they were asked to pay a bribe in interacting with public officials.
Appendix B: Survey question wording
(1) MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM QUESTIONS:

IBOPE:
Portuguese: Aqui está uma lista de áreas em que as pessoas acham que o Brasil vem enfrentando problemas de maior ou menor gravidade. Por favor, diga quais são as 3 (três) [cinco] áreas em que o(a) Sr(a) acha que o Brasil vem enfrentando os problemas mais graves.
English: Here is a list of the areas in which people think that Brazil is experiencing problems of greater or lesser severity. Please, tell me which of the three (five) areas in which you think that Brazil is facing the most serious problems?
1989:
Portuguese: E pensando agora na situação do Brasil, por favor, diga-me quais são as três áreas que o(a) Sr(a) acha que o Brasil vem enfrentando os problemas mais graves?
English: And thinking now about the situation of Brazil, please, tell me which are the three areas that you think that Brazil is facing the most serious problems?
2010:
Portuguese: Entre os assuntos desta cartela, qual o(a) Sr(a) considera que deva ser prioridade no governo da presidente eleita Dilma Rousseff? E em segundo lugar?
English: Thinking of the topics on this card, which do you consider should have the priority of the government of president elect Dilma Rousseff? And in second place?
2013:
Portuguese: Falando agora sobre os problemas do país, na sua opinião, dessas áreas presentes no cartão, quais são as TRÊS em que o Brasil tem maiores problemas? Em 1o lugar? E em 2o lugar? E em 3o lugar?
English: Speaking now about the problems of the country, in your opinion, of these areas presented on the card, which are the three in that you think Brazil has the biggest problems? In first place? In second place? In third place?

DATAFOLHA
Portuguese: Considerando as áreas que são de responsabilidade do governo federal, na sua opinião, qual é o principal problema do país hoje?
English: Considering the areas that are the responsibility of the federal government, in your opinion, which is the principal problem of the country today?

LATINOBAROMETER:
Note: LatinoBarometer surveys in Brazil are administered in Portuguese, but here we report Spanish and English from their official questionnaires.
Spanish: De la lista de problemas que le voy a mostrar, ¿cuál considera Ud. que es el más importante?
English: From the list of problems that I am going to show you, which would you consider to be the most important?
Spanish: ¿Cuál considera Ud. que es el problema más importante en el país?
English: In your opinion, which would you consider to be the country’s most important problem?
LAPOP:
2006-2014:
Portuguese: Para começar, na sua opinião, qual é o problema mais grave que o pais esta enfrentando?
English: To start, in your opinion, which is the most serious problem that the country is experiencing?

ESEB:
2002:
Portuguese: Qual é o maior problema do Brasil hoje?
English: What is Brazil’s biggest problem today?

(2) GOVERNMENT PROGRESS QUESTIONS:
LATINOBAROMETERO:
2003:
Spanish: ¿Cuánto cree Ud. que se ha progresado en reducir la corrupción en las instituciones del Estado en el último año? [1-4 point scale]
English: How much progress do you think has been made on reducing corruption in state institutions in the last year?

Spanish: ¿Cuánto cree Ud. que se ha progresado en reducir la corrupción en las instituciones del Estado en estos últimos 2 años?
English: How much progress do you think has been made in reducing corruption in state institutions in the last two years?

LAPOP:
2006-2014:
Portuguese: [Escala de 1 a 7 pontos] Até que ponto diria que o governo atual combate a corrupção no governo?
English: To what extent would you say that the current government fights corruption in the government?